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Abstract 
This paper presents the results of research on the way the network security is affected by the 
current state of TCP-IP protocol suite behaviour. A number of examples of possible issues are 
presented. When discussing classes of such issues, it is pointed out that security is affected by the 
existence of not only incorrect implementations, but also differences in implementations that can 
be used for various purposes.  
In the main part of the paper an analysis of the traffic collected on an Internet backbone link 
from the year 1999 up to 2006 is presented. The results show that the predicted behaviour can be 
observed in the real-world traffic. The differences between the measurement results and the theory 
are analysed, with a more in-depth look into a number of patterns and the changes of the patterns 
between the traffic collected in different years. In addition, an operating system detection tool is 
used to estimate the operating systems used by the nodes. Then the estimation is compared with 
anomaly patterns and the conclusions are presented. After analysing the findings, the pros and 
cons to different possible explanations of the observed patterns are presented, including flaws, 
attacks, various kinds of errors and steganography.  
 
1. Introduction 
The TCP/IP protocol stack takes its name from two protocols of the suite, 
TCP (Transport Control Protocol) and IP (Internet Protocol). The set is one of 
the most popular, if not the most popular one, protocol stacks currently used. 
Basic protocols of the stack, including IP and TCP, but also UDP (User 
Datagram Protocol) and ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol), appeared in 
their first versions more than 20 years ago. Due to the long time from and 
because of the stack popularity (and the need for new features), they have 
evolved. The newest implementations, however, are required to work together 
with the oldest ones. During the time of the protocols evolution a number of new 
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features were introduced, some older ones became obsolete. Additionally, some 
required ones are currently rarely used. The evolution also increased complexity. 
The protocols have different implementations. They range for very simple 
ones (from approximately 100 kilobytes of C language source code) to those that 
are complex and include all or nearly all features (two megabytes and more of 
source code size, like in Linux or BSD systems). Simple implementation support 
only a limited range of features, not even all that are, in theory, required. More 
complex ones, on the other hand, require much testing before deployment, as 
they have a very large number of special cases to handle. There is also a bigger 
chance for a bug, like a not handled special case. 
The RFC (Request for Comments) documents defining, among others, the 
TCP/IP protocols, do not take care over all possible scenarios. They leave much 
to the person implementing the protocol. It leads to two things. The first one is 
that a special case may pass unnoticed and, as one of the possible results, it may 
not be handled correctly. The second possibility is that it will be noticed and 
implemented, but the way it is done, and also the behaviour, may differ from one 
implementation to another.  
The causes presented above lead to the fact that two implementations of the 
same protocol may present different behaviour in many situations. In practice, 
such differences are observed. They are also used for different purposes. 
The fact that the differences can be used in practice moves the issue from the 
protocol validation and verification point of view to the security-related one. It 
also leads to many questions, including those about the number of cases or 
situations that can be used for malicious purposes and the types of attacks 
possible using those features. Another question is if efficient protection methods 
do exist, given the fact that the protocols cannot be easily changed, just as the 
systems already deployed. 
 
2. Previous work 
The problems caused by the TCP/IP implementation issues have been 
investigated since the early days of the Internet. An early overview of such 
problems can be found in RFC 2525 [1]. The more current state of the 
implementations and their common problems were presented by Bellovin in [2]. 
One of the first applications of an implementation problem was the „Ping of 
death”. An error in most TCP/IP implementations at that time led to a system 
crash when specially crafted packet of length longer than the theoretical 
maximum was received [3]. 
The ICMP Echo request and the Echo reply messages, because of their long 
data field, were used in a number of tools to pass data through a firewall or any 
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other security tool without being noticed. Two examples are project Loki [4,5] 
and an attack tool “Stacheldraht” analysed in [6]. 
Another widely explored topic is the method of IP identification numbers and 
TCP initial sequence numbers generation. For security reasons, the values 
should be unpredictable, with certain constraints, but easily predictable 
generators do exist. The systems and their generators were evaluated by 
Zalewski in [7] and [8]. The OpenBSD generator is presented in detail in [9]. 
Handley et al show how TCP/IP features can be used against IDSes in [10]. 
The field of operating system detection is probably the one where differences 
in the network stack implementation are most widely used. There are different 
approaches to the problem: passive and active. 
Passive detection uses the packets that travel across the network (so they can 
also work off-line using saved traces). The detection patterns include properties 
of the packets sent in certain states, for instance when starting and closing a TCP 
connection. Such tools are very hard, or impossible, to detect. [11] provides a 
description of the methods used. An example of a passive fingerprinting tool is 
p0f. 
Active tools, on the other hand, use carefully-crafted packets that lead to 
different responses from different systems. The popular program nmap is an 
example of such an approach [12]. The tools like nmap can be detected quite 
easily, as packets generated by them differ from those one expects to find in a 
network. It is also possible to protect from such a tool, as shown in [13]. 
Fisk et al [14] have looked into a number of traces in search for 
steganography in TCP/IP. Their results show that the predicted behaviour can be 
found. They present numbers and conclusions, but do not try to look into the 
patterns nor try to explain them using different possible reasons. 
Medina et al in [15] have measured the adoption of new TCP/IP mechanisms. 
Apart from noticing that old implementations are widely used, they also mention 
a number of problems, like hosts dropping connections when uncommon or new 
features are tried. They raise a number of interesting points. However, their 
results cover in the main part only the biggest web servers (which are also likely 
to have sophisticated protection and load-balancing mechanisms), not end-user 
computers, and are limited to web browsing, so they may not be representative 
to the Internet as a whole.  
 
3. Traffic and measurement 
The measurement presented in this paper was made using IP version 4 traffic 
traces from MAWI (Measurement and Analysis on the WIDE Internet) [16], 
from an Internet backbone link between Japan and the USA. The trace files 
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came from the years 1999 up to 2006, every year from the same period of time 
(the last days of February and the first days of March), one file from each day. 
A single trace file covers traffic from fifteen minutes to approximately one 
hour and consists of between two and more than eight million packets. The 
general statistics of the traces used in the research is presented in Table 1. As it 
is expected, the majority of packets use IP with TCP. UDP and ICMP are much 
less common. Other protocols (including IP version 4) are used by roughly 2% 
of the packets. The number increases over time, however. 
 
Table 1. Number of packets, by protocol used, in the analysed trace files, by year 
Year IPv4 TCP UDP ICMP Others-IPv4 Non-IPv4 
1999 23 065 627 18 605 749 3 310 796 1 094 743 54 339 130 
2000 23 054 869 16 173 181 5 190 319 1 623 698 67 671 188 
2001 32 756 718 26 562 696 4 749 414 1 190 609 253 999 212 664 
2002 54 103 070 44 791 521 7 079 641 1 379 663 852 245 610 596 
2003 50 079 649 40 804 567 7 346 383 1 653 492 275 207 228 459 
2004 42 920 859 38 999 609 2 899 761 1 040 368 64 865 105 921 
2005 67 964 160 56 547 378 7 879 861 2 093 372 1 443 549 922 389 
2006 73 618 505 59 382 628 11 021 736 1 242 883 1 971 258 1 794 437 
Total 367 563 457 301 867 329 49 477 911 11 318 828 4 983 133 3 874 784 
 
The traces have packet headers, but no contents. Also, the IP addresses were 
anonymized, which requires a separate analysis of each file. The lack of packet 
content also means that the data transferred in the packets of special interests 
cannot be investigated. 
The traces were analysed using custom tools, which were used to calculate 
the number of packets having certain properties, like non-zero value in the 
reserved fields that should be zero in all packets. The parameters needed for 
analysis of the results were also calculated.  An example of such value may be 
the number of packets with different TCP or IP options. The last versions of the 
tools used more than 100 different parameters. 
All of the values were calculated without context. That speeds up the 
measurements, but leaves many possible issues not covered. 
In the next step of the research, the passive operating system detection tool 
was used to look into the operating systems used by the systems generating 
anomalies and compare the results with the number of hosts using different OSes 
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in the complete trace file. The tool of choice was p0f [17]. Different factors may 
affect such tool’s accuracy, but it may be a source of valuable information. 
Taking into consideration that there was no way to check if the detection was 
correct, the p0f results were considered as guidelines only. 
 
4. Results 
The results of the performed measurement differ from the theory in many 
ways. In this part of the paper the findings will be presented. While presenting 
the results, the separate traces will be explored in certain cases. Also the possible 
explanations of the observed behaviour will be shown. 
The anomalies were found to be sent from approximately 3% of all IP 
addresses which seems to be a high number. 
The rest of this section will consist of presentations of a number of chosen 
patterns found in the results. Due to the number of parameters and the number of 
dependencies between them it is not possible to present the complete results. 
Instead, a set of them has been chosen. Each pattern from that set will be 
discussed in detail, with possible causes and explanations. 
 
4.1. Attacks  
The first finding was that the number of events of the same type differs 
greatly between the trace files. When investigating that fact it was found out that 
such differences are usually caused by a small number of flows with a high 
number of anomalies. 
One of such examples is connected with the Urgent Pointer field and URG bit 
of the TCP packet. The original purpose of the Urgent Pointer is to show the 
offset of priority (or urgent) data. That field is evaluated when URG bit is set to 
1 [18]. The RFCs does not define the field's value when URG is 0, but it is 
customary to use the value of 0. 
One of the flows is responsible for more than a half of TCP Urgent Pointer 
field being non-zero when URG bit is 0. When looking into that flow in more 
detail, it was recognized as a likely DoS (Denial of Service) attack or a very 
intensive port-scanning. At least three such flows were found in different trace 
files. As a side note, none of them comes from a day with a well-known, wide-
range attack. 
 
4.2. Probable implementation flaws 
There are, however, more reasons for the Urgent Pointer being set when URG 
is 0. Such packets are distributed between nearly all trace files and start being 
more common from the year 2002. The total number of such packets is more 
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than 4 million which makes roughly 1.4% of all TCP packets observed. That can 
be compared with only 625 packets with the URG bit set. 
There is a similar issue with Acknowledgement field and the corresponding 
ACK flag. The field points to the data offset received correctly by the receiver. 
The ACK is a set in more than 85% of the packets, but roughly 0.8% of packets 
have it zeroed and Acknowledgement field set to non-zero. 
There may be different reasons for such behaviour, even if it is an intended 
one (taking into account that when it comes to network stack implementation, 
using random values is expensive [9]). Michal Zalewski in [19] throes some 
light into that issue. There seems to be a bug in certain Windows versions that 
causes Urgent Pointer to use the data from a different connection for that value. 
It is possible that the analysed data shows the results of that, or a similar 
problem. 
 
4.3. Possible steganography 
It has been already mentioned that the ICMP messages with the large data 
field can be used to transmit data without being noticed. The two messages with 
such data field, with a possible size of more than a kilobyte, are the Echo request 
and the Echo reply [20], which are also used by the popular diagnostic tool ping. 
The ICMP protocol specification states that the host should answer with the 
Echo reply after receiving the Echo request, and that is the only situation such a 
message should be sent. 
The number of messages of both types in different years is shown in Table 2. 
The results clearly show that up to 2001 there were actually more Reply than 
Request messages. The traces examined do not provide the data field content, 
but it is likely that the higher number of Reply messages is caused by tools that 
use them to transfer data. 
The observation that such tools prefer the Reply rather than Request messages 
is caused by the fact that firewalls tend to be configured in such a way, that they 
allow packets that are related to the actions of protected users. When the firewall 
(or IDS) works without ICMP flow tracking, it may let the incoming Echo reply 
message pass as a reaction to assumed earlier Echo request.  
The lower number of the Reply messages in the later years may be connected 
to the fact of the growing popularity of stateful firewalls, which do not pass 
Reply messages if they have not recorded a Request. 
It should be also noted that the high number of Echo reply messages in the 
traces from the year 2000 is caused by two files with approximately 1 million of 
such messages in total. 
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Table 2. Comparison of the number of ICMP Echo request and Echo reply messages, by year 
Year ICMP Echo request ICMP Echo reply 
1999 126 954 190 042 
2000 95  364 1 342 600 
2001 190 156 448 526 
2002 448 172 314 280 
2003 143 226 113 732 
2004 533 844 19 353 
2005 170 579 170 722 
2006 303 459 165 080 
 
4.4. Rare options 
The TCP messages may use options. Some of them are widely used. Those 
shown in Table 3 are obsoleted, experimental or undefined.  
Many of them, like Skeeter or Bubba, should not appear in the traces at all. 
The reason for their presence in traces is unclear. Those like Echo or Echo reply 
are obsoleted.  
Their existence may be a result of software or hardware failure, but may also 
mean they have their use. 
 
Table 3. The number of rare TCP options found in the traces 
Option no Option name Number of occurrences 
6 Echo 6 
7 Echo reply 3 
9 Partial Order Connection Permitted 1 
10 Partial Order Service Profile 10 
11 CC, Connection Count 459 061 
12 CC, New 57 171 
13 CC, Echo 3 131 
14 TCP Alternate Checksum Request 1 
15 TCP Alternate Checksum Data 4 
16 Skeeter 1 
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Option no Option name Number of occurrences 
17 Bubba 9 
18 Trailer Checksum 15 
19 MD5 Signature 3 551 
20 SCPS Capabilities 1 
21 Selective Negative Acknowledgement 0 
22 Record Boundaries 0 
23 Corruption Experienced 2 
24 SNAP 4 
25 Connection Filter 92 
 Others 463 
 
4.5. Operating system detection 
The operating system detection tool p0f bases on the values of a number of 
fields (like packet length, the existence of options and their order etc.) in certain 
states. It means that, for a successful detection, the packets from one of such 
states must be present. Such packets were available for between 1.3% and 8.1% 
of the source IP addresses, depending on the year. That seems to be a small 
number, but the number of packets available for the majority of the source 
addresses is one or two.  
Of those, the most popular systems are Windows with approximately 70%, 
FreeBSD with 6.7% and Linux with 5.7%. Detection was not possible for 20%. 
Detection of more than one system was possible. 
Of the hosts with anomalous behaviour the ratio of those with attempted 
detection was higher, 88%. Of those, roughly 86% were detected as Windows, 
3.2% as FreeBSD and 1.8% as Linux. For 23% the detection was unsuccessful.  
The higher number of hosts with detected systems in the second case is 
probably due to their longer flows with enough data for the tool. 
 
5. Conclusions and future work 
The results show a number of issues that can be found in the real Internet 
traffic. The first finding is that not all hosts confirm the standards. The second 
one is that the obsoleted and never finished features are present. Hosts seem to 
use certain features in their own way. 
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Certainly, an analysis using the whole connections, not just single packets, 
should show more similar issues. Another area of possible future work is a 
similar analysis using protocols not covered in this paper, like SCTP or IP 
version 6.  
The results also show that new implementators of the TCP/IP stack should be 
very careful about the features not supported and should react reasonably to 
unexpected events, as they can be found in the traffic. A similar approach should 
be taken when implementing and deploying network security mechanisms, like 
IDSes (Intrusion Detection Systems). It seems that false-positives, when using 
the packet-based approach, are likely. The issue of deciding if an event observed 
is an attack or just a result of a normal behaviour seems to be, in many cases, 
a non-trivial problem. 
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